A closer look on the Priority Heuristic
We consider a model for decisions under risk that has recently been suggested by Brandstätter, Gigerenzer & Hertwig (2006) . This model gives a simple heuristic (called "priority heuristic") for the decision process between two given lotteries. The results in Brandstätter et al. (2006) suggest strongly that this simple heuristic is equal if not superior to the best descriptive "as-if" models for decisions under risk. It even seems to outperform Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) as introduced in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) , which is nowadays the most widely used descriptive model. In this short article we want to have a closer look at this surprising result.
We start with a summary of the priority heuristic. Let us consider two lotteries X and Y. The lottery X has the outcomes x 1 , . . . , x m with probabilities p 1 , . . . , p m , respectively. The lottery Y has the outcomes y 1 , . . . , y n with probabilities q 1 , . . . , q n , respectively. We assume that the outcomes are ordered, i.e.
x 1 < x 2 < · · · < x m and y 1 < y 2 < · · · < y n . The algorithm underlying the priority heuristic is the following 1 :
1. If 1 10 | max{x m , y n }| < x 1 − y 1 then choose lottery X. More precisely, in each step computations are performed such that the lowest number which is "natural" in a certain psychological sense is used (i.e. only the numbers 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, . . . ). Since this is not an essential point for our discussion, and it would lead to more complicated formulae, we do not consider this. We illustrate the model on three examples:
Example 1. We compare the following lotteries X and Y: X = outcome 0 1 10 probability 1/3 1/3 1/3
and Y = outcome 0 9 10 probability 1/3 1/3 1/3 .
The first step of the algorithm compares 1 10 | max{x 3 , y 3 }| = 1 with the difference of x 1 and y 1 which is zero. Hence, no decision is made.
The second step of the algorithm compares the probabilities p 1 and q 1 . Since they are identical, no decision is made.
In the last step, we finally look at the highest outcomes. Since both are the same, no conclusion is reached. This could be interpreted as indifference.
Another example of the algorithm is the following:
Example 2. X = outcome 0 100 probability 0.1% 99.9%
and Y = outcome 20 probability 100% .
The first step of the algorithm compares 1 10 | max{x 2 , y 1 }| = 10 with y 1 − x 1 = 20. Since the latter is larger, the lottery Y is selected.
Example 3. As a last example we consider the two lotteries X = outcome 0 1 probability 1% 99% and Y = outcome 2 30 probability 50% 50% .
Following the same method, the reader can check easily that X is preferred over Y. (The algorithm terminates in the second step.)
The predictions of these three examples seem slightly counterintuitive. In fact, we would not expect to observe them in experiments, but worse, in the first and third example, most people would not even consider the suggested decision.
The grossest miss-prediction, the third example, can be rejected by arguing that only "nontrivial" lotteries are admitted to the heuristic. Brandstätter et al. (2006) are not very clear on what kind of lotteries and choices are considered, but at least state explicitly that dominating cases are excluded from the application of the heuristic. This is a strong restriction, since these should be the "simplest" cases for a heuristic. To exclude the first example from consideration, we also have to assume that all cases of stochastic dominance are excluded as "trivial", as was also suggested by Brandstätter et al. (2006) . However, there seems to be no simple way to exclude the second example from consideration.
Nevertheless the priority heuristic seems to work very well when used for general experimental data, according to the results presented in Brandstätter et al. (2006) . How can we explain this discrepancy? Are the initial examples just exceptions without any significance to the overall validity of the theory? Indeed these are not simply exotic or opportunistic counter-examples. To test the predictive validity of the priority heuristic, one should go beyond the available experimental data, but look at the more "global" environment. To this aim, let us have a closer look on the experimental tests in Brandstätter et al. (2006) . In all cases, predictions of the priority heuristic (and competing models) about preferences on selected lotteries have been compared to the majority choices of test persons. Then the number of correct predictions has been measured. This seems at first glance a fair comparison and the priority heuristic scores extremely well in this test.
There is, however, a problem in this approach: the selection of these lotteries. How can this be? The lotteries have been taken from other studies that aimed to show the descriptive power of the competing theories; Brandstätter et al. (2006) describe this as a test in a "hostile environment". Although this seems very convincing, there is a flaw in this line of argument.
We first need to understand the selection process for these lotteries, since all the lotteries have been selected in order to satisfy certain conditions: first of all, there are no lotteries with "obvious" choices, where one lottery is clearly dominating the other (our first example) or where all outcomes of one lottery are larger than all outcomes of the other lottery (our third example). Standard models (like CPT) which are modifications of the "prescriptive benchmark" Expected Utility Theory, handle such clear situations with ease, e.g., all of these models (even the meanvalue) will predict correctly in the three initial examples. This is the reason, why experiments are usually performed only in unclear situations: all experimental data came from lotteries different from our first and third examples, and all but one experiment (the randomized data by Erev, Roth, Slonim & Barron (2002) ) only involved choosing between lotteries of which the expected values were close to each other, unlike our second example.
In fact, in at least one experiment the expected values of all pairs of lotteries were exactly the same. Let us have a closer look on this particular data set: Tversky & Kahneman (1992) measured the certainty equivalent of simple two-outcome lotteries. Brandstätter et al. (2006) use this data to derive a measurement on the preference between the lottery and its expected return. (If the certainty equivalent is less than the expected return, that would mean that people would prefer the expected return, otherwise they would prefer the lottery.) This conclusion is right, but obviously it only uses a small portion of the information in the data. Moreover, it takes only comparisons of lotteries into account where the expected values agree.
We can illustrate this problem on an example from physics: Newton's theory of gravitation explains most mechanical problems (like the movement of planets) with high accuracy. In order to compare Einstein's relativity theory to Newton's theory it is essential to consider cases where both theories differ significantly. Usually this is the case when extremely large velocities or masses are involved. Most experiments that aim to distinguish between both theories, will therefore involve extremely large velocities or masses. This is fine, since Einstein's theory coincides with Newton's theory in the case of small velocities and masses. We do not need to test it there. Now imagine, a new, very different theory of gravitation were to be developed which uses a formalism completely different from Newton and Einstein. Then we would naturally not only have to test it on the old experimental data involving extremely large velocities or masses. We also have to test it for small velocities and masses, before we can accept it.
Let us consider a concrete example to better understand the selection process. Consider 99 different lotteries with a probability of 1%, 2%, . . . , 99% of winning 200 and compare each of these gambles with a sure payoff of 100. In other words, consider the 99 decision problems: outcome 0 200 probability 99% 1% vs. 100, · · · , outcome 0 200 probability 1% 99% vs. 100.
The predictions of the Expected Value (EV), Expected Utility Theory (EUT), and Prospect Theory (PT) are in this case:
1. EV predicts that the lottery is preferred as long as the probability of winning is greater than 50%;
2. EUT predicts that the lottery is preferred as long as the probability of winning is greater than 54% if the utility function is the power function as measured by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) and initial wealth is neglected;
3. PT predicts that the lottery is preferred as long as the probability of winning is greater than 66% if the value and weighting functions are the same as measured by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) .
As we can see, all three theories agree for high winning probabilities (higher than 66%) and predict that in this case people would prefer the lottery over the sure payoff. They also agree for low winning probabilities (lower than 50%) and predict that people would prefer the sure payoff. (Compare Fig. 1 .) The three theories disagree, however, regarding the precise cut-off probability, in other words to what extent people are risk averse. To test the discrepancy between these theories, one therefore just needs to focus on those lotteries with winning probabilities between 50% and 66%. If we observe a majority to choose the sure payoff in this case, this would imply that PT has better predictive power than EV. Now let us look at what the priority heuristic predicts in this example. Since the difference of the minimum gains is 100 which is larger than the 1/10 of 200, the priority heuristic would always select the sure payoff regardless of the winning probability. In the local environment where EV, EUT, and PT are tested, one expects to observe the majority to be in favor of sure gains if PT is correct. Since the priority heuristic always selects the sure payoff, it is correct in this local environment. In the "global environment" of all values from 1% to 99%, however, it fails, since people prefer in fact the gamble when the winning probability is large. These cases are, however, not present in the data, as we have just seen.
One can argue that in this case the winning probability can just be rounded up to 100%, so that one would still choose the lottery. But what is the exact rule for this round-up? Should 80% also be rounded up to 100%, or how about 50%? In the latter case, the priority heuristic would just be equivalent to EV (in our example). One can also argue that we should not consider lotteries with high probabilities of winning, i.e., we can set a "boundary condition" to rule out those "trivial" decisions. But how to set the boundary? If we restrict the priority heuristic only to "difficult" decisions, namely, lotteries with similar EV (as was suggested in Brandstätter et al. (2006) , page 426), then we need a more difficult "screening" process, i.e., we need to calculate the EV before deciding whether it is appropriate to apply the priority heuristic, but this screening process would then destroy the simplicity of the priority heuristic (as Brandstätter et al. (2006) admit, too) .
In summary, we should not test a theory which differs completely from Expected Utility Theory solely on experimental data that was obtained in order to find subtle differences between people's actual behavior and the predictions of Expected Utility Theory. It must also work in cases which are usually not considered, since the predictions of Expected Utility Theory and people's behavior coincide on them.
Let us perform now a more thorough analysis of one particular data set studied in Brandstätter et al. (2006) , which we have already mentioned, namely the one from Tversky & Kahneman (1992) to demonstrate that the predictive power of the priority heuristic is substantially reduced when taking more diverse data into account:
Here two-outcome lotteries are compared with a sure outcome, namely the certainty equivalent of the lottery, and we know that for exactly this value the average test person was indifferent, for all lower sure outcomes they preferred the lottery and for all larger the sure outcome. This means we are in the special case where we compare a two-outcome lottery X with a certain outcome lottery Y, i.e. m = 2 and n = 1. First, we can simplify the heuristic in this case. Let us assume that x 1 < y 1 < x 2 . (All other cases are uninteresting, since the prediction of the decision should be clear, although we would like to mention that the priority heuristic fails in some of these cases, as we have seen in the third example.)
1. In the first step, we choose Y if 1 10 x 2 < y 1 − x 1 . Other cases do not occur.
2. In the second step, we cannot choose Y, since we have q 1 = 1 and therefore p 1 > q 1 + 1 10 = 1.1 is not possible.
3. In the third step, we would inevitably choose X, since x 2 > y 1 by assumption.
Summarizing this, we see that the whole decision procedure reduces to this single rule:
Using this, we can easily compute the certainty equivalent of a lottery X under the priority heuristic as
Now we can understand several interesting facts:
• The certainty equivalent (CE) is independent of the probabilities.
• If x 1 = 0 then CE is larger than the expected return of X exactly if p 1 > 9 10 and the expected return is larger than CE if and only if p 1 < 9 10 .
• Thus, if we compare X with its expected return, then the heuristic is predicting that a person is taking the "sure thing" whenever p 1 < 9 10 and the lottery for p 1 > 9 10 . This agrees qualitatively with the predictions of most other models (like CPT). If we consider losses as well, this implies the famous four-fold pattern of risk attitudes: risk averse behavior in gains with medium/large probabilities and in losses with low probabilities, risk seeking behavior in gains with low probabilities and losses with medium/large probabilities.
We now also have a nice test of the heuristic at hands: we can compare the estimated CE with the measured CE 2 . The average deviation for the heuristic, for CPT (with the classical functions and parameters of Tversky & Kahneman (1992) ) and for the expected value 3 is given in Fig. 2 . This quantitative comparison shows that the heuristic is not performing well at all on this data. In fact, even the (nondescriptive and parameter-less) expected value has a much smaller error, so the difference cannot be explained by a lack of fitting parameters in the priority heuristic! Average deviation between measured CE/x 2 in the data of Tversky & Kahneman (1992) and the CE/x 2 predicted by the various theories. We see that the priority heuristic is clearly outperformed not only by CPT, but also by the (parameter-free) expected value. -A random guess for random data would have an average deviation of 0.33.
We can illustrate this effect graphically. Assuming that x 1 = 0, we get the following predictions for CE(X)/x 2 , compared to the actual data, see Fig. 3 . Now we see that the analysis in Brandstätter et al. (2006) only reported whether the CE value is on the correct side of the expected value. This is indeed the case for the priority heuristic, only the precise value is far away from the measured value.
In other words: the priority heuristic utilizes the fact that experimental data is usually obtained in situations where one wants to find a difference between Expected Utility Theory and actual behavior, i.e. risk-averse behavior for medium to large probabilities of a gain, and risk-seeking behavior for small probabilities of a gain. We might say, the only thing that the priority heuristic in such situations does, is to predict the preference for a lottery over a sure outcome whenever the probability for a gain is low, since then the experimenter usually wants to see such a behavior and has therefore designed the lottery in a way where he can measure this deviation from the Expected Utility Theory. (Again, this is a very reasonable approach to test modifications of Expected Utility Theory, like CPT, but it is not a good setting to test a brand-new idea.) In cases where the experimental design was not tailor-made in this way, the priority heuristic scores quite mediocrely, as we have seen from the measurements of the certainty equivalent. The observation that the priority heuristic does not work well when the expected values of the lotteries disagree was already made by Brandstätter et al. (2006) . Our analysis shows why this is the case and explains why the data analysis in Brandstätter et al. (2006) seems to imply that the priority heuristic outperforms standard theories also in the "general" case, i.e. on classical experimental data.
To understand the shortfalls of the heuristic in a different way, we can also introduce another heuristic which is much simpler than the priority heuristic, and which applies to the same class of lotteries, namely lotteries with up to two outcomes. In this heuristic, we normalize the lower outcome to zero and then simply divide the larger outcome by 10. We use the result as a "value" of the lottery. When comparing two lotteries, we choose the one with the larger value.
Since this heuristic is very fast (it actually contains only one step) we call it "fast-forward heuristic" (FF-heuristic). What are the properties of this FF-heuristic? First, we notice that, in the simplest case of comparing a two-outcome lottery with a sure outcome, the FF-heuristic completely agrees with the priority heuristic. We have already seen this, since we have shown that the priority heuristic reduces in this case to the rule (1) which is nothing else than the mathematical expression for the FF-heuristic. This implies that the FF-heuristic can explain the four-fold pattern of risk attitudes as well as the priority heuristic, and that the quantitative analysis for the data by Tversky and Kahneman in Brandstätter et al. (2006) applies completely to the FF-heuristic. This ensures that the FF-heuristic scores as high as the priority heuristic in the corresponding ranking in Brandstätter et al. (2006) , although the FF-heuristic is obviously much simpler than the priority heuristic. That in more complicated situations the priority heuristic might score better can be readily explained with the surplus on simplicity of the new heuristic 4 .
Have we now found out how people really decide about lotteries? Of course not, since again the detailed analysis of this section shows that the results of the FF-heuristic are not as good as they look like: the FF-heuristic is equivalent to the priority heuristic in predicting certainty equivalents and therefore gives as bad predictions as the priority heuristic. The FF-heuristic is therefore unmasked as what it really is: a gross oversimplification that works in a very narrow range of cases, but fails completely in general cases.
A general model for simple heuristics
Sometimes a look from a different angle helps to get a hold on concepts. Let us therefore have a look on the problem of finding simple heuristics for a decision under risk in a theoretical way. Of course, we are not talking here about finding out what heuristics people actually use, this cannot be done by theoretical considerations alone. (Gone are the times of Aristotle.) However, one might make progress on understanding "as-if" models and their possibilities by studying the theoretical structure behind them.
For this exposition, we restrict our analysis to a comparison of two lotteries with two outcomes each. In this case we have essentially six parameters to deal with (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , p 1 , q 1 ), where p 1 and q 1 are the probabilities for the lower outcome in the first and second lottery, respectively 5 . In this "six-dimensional configuration space" the actual decision behavior of a person separates the space into three subsets: one set of comparisons where he prefers the lottery X, one subset where he prefers Y and one where he is indifferent. A model for decisions under risk also performs such a separation, but can obviously only aim to approximate the "real life" distribution as well as possible.
Models like CPT use a relatively complicated nonlinear functional to do this separation. Simple heuristics in the sense of Brandstätter et al. (2006) try to do it only with rules which are linear in the parameters, since they argue that people do not multiply probabilities and outcomes, and hence a linear model should be superior in describing their preferences. Such linear rules like "If p 1 > q 1 + 1 10 , then choose Y." correspond to separations along hyperplanes 6 in the configurational space, since they are nothing else than linear inequalities.
If we build an algorithm like the priority heuristic, then we define the decision in each step on some subset of the configuration space which is bounded by a hyperplane. Taking everything together we have a decomposition of the configurational space into the three decision sets (prefer X, prefer Y, indifferent) along pieces of hyperplanes. The number of steps we use in our algorithm determines the complexity of the final sets, but they are in any case piecewise bounded by hyperplanes. This is all very abstract, and since we cannot really get a geometric representation of a six-dimensional configurational space in this two-dimensional article, we take a closer look on a special case to illustrate our ideas. We set y 1 = y 2 and x 1 = 0, i.e., the first lottery has a lower outcome of zero, and the second is a sure thing with outcome y 1 . In this case, we have only three parameters left: x 2 , p 1 , y 1 . How do the decision sets look like in this case?
For the priority heuristic we can easily see from our considerations above that the sets "choose X" and "choose Y" are separated by the plane y 1 = 1 10 x 2 . This is in particular independent of p 1 . The expected return, on the other hand, leads to the separation set y 1 = x 2 (1 − p 1 ). Some experimental data can be found in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) where the CE of two-outcome lotteries have been measured: y 1 (x 2 , p 2 ) corresponds simply to the CE of a lottery defined by x 2 and p 2 . Not surprisingly, the (interpolated) data does not lie on a plane and is not independent of the probability p 2 , as one can see already from Fig. 3 .
That the data does not follow a plane, does not mean that there cannot be a heuristic explaining this data, it only means that the priority heuristic fails to explain it, and we have seen this already above. However, the highly nonlinear distribution of the data points would have to be approximated by a small number of planes which seems to be difficult. If we apply further restrictions to the choice of the planes (e.g. we only allow for coefficients like 1, 2, 5, 10, . . . ), the task seems to be quite impossible.
Summarizing, we see that actual behavior corresponds to a highly nonlinear situation, where linear approximations seem to be inadequate: we might capture a couple of cases with a linear model, but we will always fail to obtain a reasonably complete picture.
3 Priority Heuristic -"as-if" model or actual behavior?
We have seen that the priority heuristic is not very accurate as an "as-if" model. But can it at least model the decision process in humans better than the usual models, like CPT?
Of course nobody assumes that people have a CPT-calculator in their brains. But is it more reasonable to assume that they have a priority heuristic algorithm in their brains? If people really behaved according to this heuristic, what would that imply? First, people would not integrate the information of a lottery (outcomes and probabilities), but consider them only separately. This is an assumption that seems to us a little oversimplifying regarding the quite complex decision process that people follow when deciding about lotteries -but we admit that people might be less complex than we think. Second, intermediate outcomes would not be considered at all 7 . This is clearly false, as can be seen, e.g., from stochastic dominance violation examples (Birnbaum 2005) or simply our first example. Third, one would predict a large increase in decision time when people have to consider more steps of the heuristic. However, the data provided on this on page 423 in Brandstätter et al. (2006) shows that the ratio (for lotteries with two outcomes) is 9.3 to 10.1 seconds. This would mean that the first step takes approximately ten times as long as the following two steps together, and that these two last steps are performed in only 0.8 seconds. Even taking into account the time it takes to read and understand the decision, before the actual decision process can start, this seems to be a strong indicator that people actually do not follow the priority heuristic.
There are also direct ways to elicit the actual decision process as seen by subjects, e.g. tracking of information search patterns, verbal reports etc. These additional process data are important to reveal the real decision process. We would like to mention Johnson & Schkade (1989) who recorded verbal protocols when deciding on certainty-and probability equivalent. They found in their context that some subjects actually use heuristics, including probability-outcome tradeoffs, while others make direct use of the expected value.
In conclusion, we can (up to now) see the priority heuristic only as an "asif" model without any clear relation to actual decision processes. And as such an "as-if" model it predicts some observed facts correctly, but it badly fails in other, more thorough tests. It is of course not entirely fair to expect the heuristic to perform better than well-founded, complex models like CPT. One might consider therefore the heuristic as a surprisingly simple model that guesses decisions of average persons in specific situations (and only there!) quite well 8 . Of course, it would be presumptuous, to assume that people generally follow a simple hardwired algorithm when faced with decisions, so it is not surprising that the model does not work in more general cases.
So, what can we do with the priority heuristic? Applying it to predict actual behavior is only possible in certain cases, but there are well-established models performing well in general situations. They are more complicated to evaluate, but this is not a significant disadvantage in the age of computers. Applications of the priority heuristic are also limited to the description of average persons, not taking into account individual differences. It is also restricted to simple lotteries, preventing most practical applications, e.g. in finance or economics.
For all of these reasons, we should probably change our view on the priority heuristic a little. Instead of looking for applications, we should just think of it as a nice and pretty curiosity that demonstrates the possibilities, but also the limitations, of simple models in explaining the immense complexity of human behavior.
